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Abstract. Adversarial machine learning research has recently demon-
strated the feasibility to confuse automatic speech recognition (ASR)
models by introducing acoustically imperceptible perturbations to audio
samples. To help researchers and practitioners gain better understanding
of the impact of such attacks, and to provide them with tools to help
them more easily evaluate and craft strong defenses for their models,
we present Adagio, the first tool designed to allow interactive exper-
imentation with adversarial attacks and defenses on an ASR model in
real time, both visually and aurally. Adagio incorporates AMR and
MP3 audio compression techniques as defenses, which users can interac-
tively apply to attacked audio samples. We show that these techniques,
which are based on psychoacoustic principles, effectively eliminate tar-
geted attacks, reducing the attack success rate from 92.5% to 0%. We
will demonstrate Adagio and invite the audience to try it on the Mozilla
Common Voice dataset.
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1 Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are highly vulnerable to adversarial instances in
the image domain [3]. Such instances are crafted by adding small impercepti-
ble perturbations to benign instances to confuse the model into making wrong
predictions. Recent work has shown that this vulnerability extends to the audio
domain [1], undermining the robustness of state-of-the-art models that leverage
DNNs for the task of automatic speech recognition (ASR). The attack manip-
ulates an audio sample by carefully introducing faint “noise” in the background
that humans easily dismiss. Such perturbation causes the ASR model to tran-
scribe the manipulated audio sample as a target phrase of the attacker’s choosing.
Through this research demonstration, we make two major contributions:
1. Interactive exploration of audio attack and defense. We present Ada-
gio, the first tool designed to enable researchers and practitioners to interac-
tively experiment with adversarial attack and defenses on an ASR model in
ar
X
iv
:1
80
5.
11
85
2v
1 
 [c
s.L
G]
  3
0 M
ay
 20
18
2 Das et al.
Fig. 1. Adagio usage scenario. (1) Jane uploads an audio file that is transcribed
by DeepSpeech; then she performs an adversarial attack on the audio in real time by
entering a target transcription after selecting the attack option from the dropdown
menu. (2) Jane decides to perturb the audio to change the last word of the sentence
from “joanna” to “marissa”; she can listen to the original audio and see the transcription
by clicking on the “Original” badge. (3) Jane applies MP3 compression to recover the
original, correct transcription from the manipulated audio; clicking on a waveform
plays back the audio from the selected position. (4) Jane can experiment with multiple
audio samples by adding more cards. For ease of presentation, operations 1, 2 and 3
are shown as separate cards.
real time (see demo: https://youtu.be/0W2BKMwSfVQ). Adagio incorporates
AMR and MP3 audio compression techniques as defenses for mitigating pertur-
bations introduced by the attack. Figure 1 presents a brief usage scenario show-
ing how users can experiment with their own audio samples. Adagio stands for
Adversarial Defense for Audio in a Gadget with Interactive Operations.
2. Compression as an effective defense. We demonstrate that non-adaptive
adversarial perturbations are extremely fragile, and can be eliminated to a large
extent by using audio processing techniques like Adaptive Multi-Rate (AMR) en-
coding and MP3 compression. We assume a non-adaptive threat model since an
adaptive version of the attack is prohibitively slow and often does not converge.
2 Adagio: Experimenting with Audio Attack & Defense
We first provide a system overview of Adagio, then we describe its primary
building blocks and functionality. Adagio consists of four major components:
(1) an interactive UI (Figure 1); (2) a speech recognition module; (3) a targeted
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attack generator module; and (4) an audio preprocessing (defense) module. The
three latter components reside on a back-end server that performs the computa-
tion. The UI communicates the user intent with the back-end modules through a
websocket messaging service, and uses HTTP to upload/download audio files for
processing. When the messaging service receives an action to be performed from
the front-end, it leverages a custom redis-based job queue to activate the correct
back-end module. When the back-end module finishes its job, the server pings
back the UI through the websocket messaging service to update the UI with the
latest results. Below, we describe the other three components in Adagio.
2.1 Speech Recognition
In speech recognition, state-of-the-art systems leverage Recurrent Neural Net-
works (RNNs) to model audio input. The audio sample is broken up into frames
{x(1), ..., x(T )} and fed sequentially to the RNN function f(·) which outputs an-
other sequence {y(1), ..., y(T ′)}, where each y(t) is a probability distribution over
a set of characters. The RNN maintains a hidden state h(t) which is used to
characterize the sequence up until the current input x(t), such that, (y(t), h(t)) =
f(x(t−1), h(t−1)). The most likely sequence based on the output probability dis-
tributions then becomes the transcription for the audio input. The performance
of speech-to-text models is commonly measured in Word Error Rate (WER),
which corresponds to the minimum number of word edits required to change the
transcription to the ground truth phrase.
Adagio uses Mozilla’s implementation [5] of DeepSpeech [4], a state-of-the-
art speech-to-text DNN model, to transcribe the audio in real time.
2.2 Targeted Audio Adversarial Attacks
Given a model function m(·) that transcribes an audio input x as a sequence of
characters y, i.e., m(x) = y, the objective of the targeted adversarial attack is to
introduce a perturbation δ such that the transcription is now a specific sequence
of characters y′ of the attacker’s choosing, i.e., m(x+ δ) = y′. The attack is only
considered successful if there is no error in the transcription.
Adagio allows users to compute adversarial samples using a state-of-the-
art iterative attack [1]. After uploading an audio sample to Adagio, the user
can click the attack button and enter the target transcription for the audio (see
Figure 1.1). The system then runs 100 iterations of the attack and updates the
transcription displayed on the screen at each step to show progress of the attack.
2.3 Compression as Defense
In the image domain, compression techniques based on psychovisual theory have
been shown to mitigate adversarial perturbations of small magnitude [2]. We ex-
tend that hypothesis to the audio domain and let users experiment with AMR
encoding and MP3 compression on adversarially manipulated audio samples.
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Table 1. Word Error Rate (WER) and the targeted attack success rate on the Deep-
Speech model (lower is better for both). AMR and MP3 eliminate all targeted attacks,
and significantly improves WER.
Defense WER (no attack) WER (with attack) Targeted attack success rate
None 0.369 1.287 92.45%
AMR 0.488 0.666 0.00%
MP3 0.400 0.780 0.00%
Since these techniques are based on psychoacoustic principles (AMR was spe-
cially developed to encode speech), we posit that these techniques could effec-
tively remove the adversarial components from the audio which are imperceptible
to humans, but would confuse the model.
To determine the efficacy of these compression techniques in defending the
ASR model, we created targeted adversarial instances from the first 100 test
samples of the Mozilla Common Voice dataset using the attack as described
in [1]. We constructed five adversarial audio instances for every sample, each
transcribing to a phrase randomly picked from the dataset, yielding a total of
500 adversarial samples. We then preprocessed these samples before feeding it
to the DeepSpeech model. Table 1 shows the results from this experiment. We
see that the preprocessing defenses are able to completely eliminate the targeted
success rate of the attack.
3 Conclusion
We present Adagio, an interactive tool that empowers users to experiment
with adversarial audio attacks and defenses. We will demonstrate and highlight
Adagio’s features using a few usage scenarios on the Mozilla Common Voice
dataset, and invite our audience to try out Adagio and freely experiment with
their own queries.
References
1. Carlini, N., Wagner, D.: Audio adversarial examples: Targeted attacks on speech-
to-text. arXiv:1801.01944 (2018)
2. Das, N., Shanbhogue, M., Chen, S.T., Hohman, F., Chen, L., Kounavis, M.E., Chau,
D.H.: Keeping the bad guys out: Protecting and vaccinating deep learning with jpeg
compression. arXiv:1705.02900 (2017)
3. Goodfellow, I., Shlens, J., Szegedy, C.: Explaining and harnessing adversarial ex-
amples. In: ICLR (2015)
4. Hannun, A., Case, C., Casper, J., Catanzaro, B., Diamos, G., Elsen, E., Prenger, R.,
Satheesh, S., Sengupta, S., Coates, A., et al.: Deep speech: Scaling up end-to-end
speech recognition. arXiv:1412.5567 (2014)
5. Mozilla: Deepspeech, https://github.com/mozilla/DeepSpeech
